VCAT Volume 12 No 9
1. A hyperlink to a NOD is not giving notice of a decision
Electronic communications are now widely used by government entities, including responsible authorities, to communicate for various reasons with persons who interact with them. But does a hyperlink to a Notice of Decision (NOD) on a letter sent by email satisfy the notification provisions of section 64(1) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 and Regulation 33 of the Planning and Environment Regulations 2015?
In Amsellem v Merri-bek CC [2025] VCAT 309, the Council granted an amendment to a permit for the construction of a three storey building containing 14 dwellings. The Applicant lodged an appeal lodged out of time challenging conditions.
The Applicant submitted that the Responsible Authority’s letter containing the link to the NOD was not accompanied by a copy of the NOD and that the link contained in that letter did not provide access to the NOD. It was therefore argued it was an administrative error by the Responsible Authority.
Having regard to relevant provisions of Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 and the Planning and Environment Regulations, the Tribunal held reg 53 mandates that a notice or document cannot be either given or served via an electronic communication that is a hyperlink or otherwise an electronic address within a responsible authority’s own information system that requires the recipient to retrieve the notice or document by the action of the recipient without the express consent of the recipient to this way of giving notice being first obtained by the responsible authority.
The Tribunal extended the time for commencing the proceeding. It excused the failure of the Responsible Authority to give notice of its decision to amend a permit under clause 62 of Schedule 1 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 on the basis that an application for review would be made by the Applicant on receipt of a NOD in compliance was highly likely.
The Tribunal’s decision in this matter is an important reminder to responsible authorities that relevant documents must be attached to correspondence and hyperlinks are not sufficient notification, unless there has been a prior agreement.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Permit > Notice of Decision
2. Is providing names to give notice of an application for permit a breach of privacy?
In the Human Rights List of VCAT, two landowners (the Applicants) in Strachan v La Trobe CC (Human Rights) [2025] VCAT 328 complained that pursuant to the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 that the Council had provided their personal details, including their addresses, to the permit applicant.
The Council submitted that the notification of landowners adjacent to land subject to a planning application is required under the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) and that the Applicant’s addresses were the addresses provided to the Council as their preferred addresses for correspondence.
The Council conceded it was not required by law to disclose names and addresses of adjoining landowners to a planning permit applicant but submitted it was authorised to facilitate notification of a planning permit application to adjoining landowners by providing the names and addresses of adjoining landowners to a planning permit applicant, in order to facilitate the objection process under the P&E Act (Tribunal emphasis).
Accordingly, the Council submitted disclosures of names and addresses of adjacent landowners where a planning permit application relevant to those landowners has been made is either:
- expressly authorised by section 53 of the P&E Act and so a disclosure authorised by law under Information Privacy Principles (IPP) 2.1(f); or
- a disclosure for a secondary purpose related to the primary purpose of collection and so authorised under (IPP 2.1(a)).
Whilst the Council submitted it was required to provide the addresses solely for the purposes of being sent rates notices for the Applicants’ land and not for any other purpose, the Applicants’ noted that the rates notices sent to them by the Council state that “Personal information included in this notice is used by [the Council] for the primary purpose of issuing and collecting municipal rates or for a lawful secondary purpose” and refers the reader to visit the Council website to read its privacy policy.
In seeking to rely on the exemptions in IPP 2.1(a) & 2.1(f), the Tribunal noted that the Council appeared to have conceded that the Applicants’ personal information was not disclosed for the primary purpose for which it was collected. This position is consistent with the statement in the rates notices that the personal information contained in the rates notices (which included the landowner’s names and addresses as provided to Council) were used for the primary purpose of issuing and collecting municipal rates.
However, the Council submitted that the primary purpose of the collection of the Applicants’ names and addresses was to ensure correspondence the Council was required under the P&E Act to send to the Applicants as landowners would reach the Applicants and, more particularly, to facilitate and manage the planning permit process under the P&E Act.
Having considered the evidence from Council’s planning manager, it was satisfied that the primary purpose of the collection of the Applicants’ names and addresses was to ensure correspondence from the Council, that was required under the P&E Act to send to the Applicants, would be received by them.
Specifically, it was noted that the Council’s privacy policy states under Principal 1 that the personal information collected typically includes names and addresses and that this information may be used to contact a landowner “on a range of issues in the performance of its functions in the exercise of its powers under various Acts.”
The Tribunal also found that where the Council decides a planning permit applicant should notify potential objectors to a planning permit application, the disclosure of the names and addresses of adjacent lot owners is for the secondary purpose of ensuring that the planning permit applicant properly notifies adjacent lot owners so that those adjacent lot owners may object to the planning permit application if they wish to do so (editor emphasis).
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Permit > Application for permit > Notice of Application > Privacy
3. Private pontoon on public land given the nod
Despite the acquiring authority’s opposition for the construction of a private pontoon along the Maribyrnong River, the Tribunal in Unal v Moonee Valley CC (Corrected) [2025] VCAT 267 approved the grant of the permit subject to conditions, including a condition that the pontoon must be removed within 30 days after the Council issues a Notice of Intention under the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986.
Other concerns raised by the Council included landscape and visual impacts.
The Tribunal noted there have been numerous decisions that have dealt with land potentially subject to acquisition, in particular, McCarthy v Glen Eira CC [2004] VCAT 927 which the Tribunal considered provides a helpful summary of informative decisions relating to acquisition prior to 2004. Collectively, these decisions establish:
- whether the land affected by the potential acquisition remains an important part of the strategic plan;
- whether the land affected by the potential acquisition are not defunct or obsolete reservations no longer required;
- acquisitions need long term planning;
- the orderly provision and co-ordination of public utilities and other facilities for the benefit of the community is consistent with the objectives for planning in Victoria;
- it is important for a permit applicant to demonstrate that the use or development of the land subject to acquisition will not prevent the purpose of the acquisition that is desirable from a broader planning context;
- whether or not it can be demonstrated that the intermediate use of the land would prevent the ultimate execution of the acquisition. In other words, would the long term purpose of the reservation/overlay, be prejudiced by short term use and development;
- land should not be sterilised from a short or medium term use so long as the long term objective is maintained;
- the decision guidelines of the PAO contemplate that permits will issue within the PAO area and the decision guidelines suggest possible conditions relating to demolition, compensation and extent of development being approved; and
- in the case of McCarthy where a long lead time for the acquisition was possible and the property may have mixed ownership, a section 173 agreement notifying of no compensation is payable was required as a permit condition.
In the current proceeding the Tribunal found:
- the pontoon does not occupy land sought to be acquired for future public path, but rather, is anchored to the side of the land identified in the PAO;
- depending upon the design of the public path, it is possible that the pontoon may not need to be removed to accommodate the public path in the future;
- conditions can be imposed to ensure that no compensation is payable by the acquiring authority and that the pontoon is used for private use only;
- a substantial administration burden (any more than any other acquiring of land process) associated will not occur with the pontoon and conditions can be imposed to manage the eventual acquisition of the land;
- any requests for similar pontoons on nearby sites will need to be determined based on the conditions that apply in that instance; and
- the pontoon is an amenity available to the occupiers of the site at the moment and available amenities is a factor that contributes to land value. However, the pontoon’s contribution to the value of the site is limited by the presence of the PAO and conditions imposed stating no compensation is payable.
Further, the Tribunal found both the infrastructure and recreation functions of the waterway corridor will be unaffected by the proposed pontoon. It gave substantial weight to Melbourne Water having no objections to the proposal on the basis of the Land Subject to Inundation Overlay, in addition to the Jetties Consent Agreement entered into circa 2013 and the Parks Victoria consent dated 28 March 2014. From these documents it can be ascertained that these authorities do not consider the pontoon to hamper or affect public assets.
Whilst the pontoon is for private use, the Tribunal considered it is an asset that encourages the continued use of the Maribyrnong River corridor for open space and recreation pursuits. It imposed a condition that the proposed pontoon will be for domestic use only associated with the occupants of the subject land.
On landscape and visual impacts, the Tribunal found the lightweight structure of the pontoon will not create a significant impact on the landscape or the visual appearance of the river corridor.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Pontoon
4. Should an owner should be released from obligation to replant at least one canopy tree in same location as the removed tree?
Yang v Whitehorse CC [2025] VCAT 306 involved a protracted dispute between a landowner wishing to construct a large single dwelling which impacted upon a Pin Oak tree protected under a vegetation control.
The Council refused the application to remove the Pin Oak tree from the site, however the landowner commenced removing it anyway. About 70 to 80 per cent of it had been removed by the time Council officers had inspected the site.
Council filed an Enforcement Order (EO) which was subject to a Tribunal consent order.
After making numerous requests to revegetate the site, which had been refused by the Council, the landowner received the Council’s ‘report and consent’ in its capacity as reporting authority under the Building Regulations 2018.
The effect of the approved plans under the report and consent show what’s left of the Pin Oak (mainly its trunk) in the decking area of the proposed dwelling.
The landowner then sought to amend the EO to remove the obligation to replant a canopy tree in the same location as the Pin Oak. It was argued that the landowner cannot comply with the EO due to the subsequent construction of dwelling and its near completion.
In refusing to amend the EO, the Tribunal held:
- the Council had consistently required a revegetation plan to comply with the EO requirements to replant one or more canopy trees in the same location as the Pin Oak;
- the landowner decided to construct a dwelling which she knew or ought to have known would make it impossible to comply with the EO;
- consequently, amendment of the EO as sought by the landowner with the effect of releasing her from its key obligation would amount to rewarding her for the contravention;
- the Council’s conduct in granting report and consent under building law for the dwelling does not excuse the landowner’s non-compliance with the EO and warrant its amendment; and
- the Council’s consideration of the policy and decision guidelines in the planning scheme in refusing to be satisfied of the First and Second Revegetation Plans did not warrant amendment of the EO.
It would seem the landowner’s scheming to avoid compliance with the EO has come undone.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Vegetation removal
5. Refusal of dwelling within 1km of proposed wind farm
In WestWind Energy Development Pty Ltd v Buloke SC [2025] VCAT 289, the Tribunal set aside a Council decision to approve a single dwelling in the Farming Zone to be located within 1km of a proposed wind farm.
Council’s decision was contrary to Council officer’s recommendation to refuse the application for the dwelling.
Whilst Council was aware of the proposal of the wind farm, a permit had not been granted for the proposal. Council’s position was that in the absence of data the effects of the wind farm on the local community and surrounding environment are not yet known.
The Tribunal commented that in some ways it found this to be an unusual case because the control speaks to, in this case, a proposed wind energy facility. A permit for the wind farm has not been issued and it is unknown if approval would be granted.
However, the Tribunal considered it needed to put that aside and make a decision based on whether a permit should be granted for the proposed dwelling given the provisions of the planning scheme. It was relevant to consider if the proposed dwelling would be adversely affected by noise and shadow flicker impacts (because it is located within one kilometre of a proposed wind energy facility). It was also relevant to consider if the proposed location and building design of the dwelling has attempted to avoid or reduce noise and shadow flicker impacts from the operation of the wind energy facility.
The Tribunal made the observation that in the event that the application for the wind farm is withdrawn or lapses, at that point, the proposed dwelling would become as-of-right again.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Wind Energy Facility > Proximity of dwellings
6. Limited third party rights under the Environment Protection Act
There appears to be an increase of applications to VCAT under various provisions under the Environment Protection Act 2017 (EP Act). It is interesting to note some of the differences with third party rights under the EP Act compared to the Planning and Environment Act 1987.
In Veolia Recycling & Recovery Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority [2025] VCAT 347, the Tribunal convened a second practice day hearing to consider any relevant parties identified by the decision maker in its response to Tribunal’s Practice Notice PNPE2 – Information from Decision Maker’s (PNPE2), and whether and what notice to third parties is required….
The proceedings involved an application for review under section 430(1)(b) of the EP Act following the failure to decide an application for a development licence to develop a commercial waste transfer station by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA).
During the consultation period for the development licence application, the EPA received 751 submissions. Under section 69(1) of the EP Act, the EPA had four months from receiving the development licence application to either issue the development licence or to refuse the development licence. However, the EPA did not make a decision within this four month period though a delegate of the EPA subsequently formed the view that the development licence application should be refused.
Whilst section 69(6) of the EP Act not only informs submitters of the decision of the EPA, it importantly informs submitters of the existence of the statutory right conferred on them under section 434(3) to seek review of that decision.
Section 434(4) also provides that, without limiting section 5 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, VCAT may take into account a number of matters when determining whether a person’s interests are affected by a decision, including:
(e) whether the person has a genuine connection with the subject of the decision, including but not limited to whether the person made comments or submissions to the Authority in relation to the application for, or in the review of, the licence that is the subject of the decision.
Conversely, submitters do not have a statutory right to notice of a decision by the Authority to refuse to grant a development licence. The Tribunal observed that it is reasonable to conclude that the policy underpinning this deliberate decision on the part of Parliament is that the EPA’s decision to refuse a development licence, has been made after considering all the matters required to be considered under section 69(3) of the EPA Act including all comments and submissions received during the consultation period of an application for a development licence.
Further, submitters do not have a statutory right to notice of the failure of the EPA to make a decision in respect to an application for a development licence within the relevant prescribed time. This is explicable by the fact that submitters also do not have a statutory right to commence an application for review with the Tribunal where there is a failure to decide by the EPA.
In refusing any further notice of the application for review to be required, the Tribunal stated:
The absence of a statutory right to commence an application for review by a submitter (or generally by a third party) to review a decision to refuse to grant a development licence or where there has been a failure to decide by the Authority must be taken as a deliberate and intended outcome on the part of Parliament.
Properly characterised, s 433 of the EP Act does not confer any right on any person; it confers a power on the Tribunal to join a person to an application for review commenced where there has been a failure by the Authority to decide an application for a development permit. This power is in addition to, and comes later in time to, the general power conferred on the Tribunal under s 60 of the VCAT Act.
There is no requirement under the EP Act or the VCAT Act to inform any person of the Tribunal’s power under s 60 of the VCAT Act to join a person to a proceeding. That is because like s 433 of the EP Act, s 60 of the VCAT Act does not confer a statutory right on any person to do anything within a particular time period; it confers a power on the Tribunal.
The facts of this matter are that although the proceeding was commenced by the applicant as a result of the Authority’s failure to decide the development application licence, on 9 April 2025 the Authority has made its position in this proceeding known; it will oppose the grant of the development licence.
In the context described above, I am not satisfied that either the number of submissions made to the Tribunal, or the proximity of persons to the subject land, or the grounds on which the Authority now opposes the grant of the development licence are sufficient to require notice be given to any person of the existence of the Tribunal’s power to join persons to this proceeding under s 433 of the EPA. [27-31]
Section 434 of the EP Act can be contrasted with the rights of third parties to be party to refusal appeals under the P&E Act. However, as practitioners would be aware, under the recently released Townhouse and Low-Rise Code, where all the applicable standards are met under Clause 55 of the Victoria Planning Provisions, there will be no third party right of appeal. It will be interesting to see whether more third party rights are removed as opportunities to streamline planning approvals are pursued.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Environment Protection Act 2017
7. Jumping the gun – appeal struck out on basis RA made no decision
In Koolstra v Manningham CC [2025] VCAT 346, the Tribunal summarily dismissed an application seeking a review of a Council ‘decision’ regarding a section 173 Agreement.
The Applicant lodged planning permit application for a two lot subdivision together with the removal of native vegetation and the creation of a carriageway easement. The section 173 Agreement applying to the subject land provides that certain things are prohibited on the land unless the Council provides its consent for those things to occur.
The application for planning permit was refused by Council, with one of the grounds being that the application will breach the section 173 Agreement.
The appeal was lodged by the Applicant under section 149(1)(b) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act), purportedly in relation to the refusal by the Council to provide its consent under clauses of the section 173 Agreement.
In summarily dismissing the application, the Tribunal found that in order for there to have been a decision made by the Council in relation to the ‘question’ of whether the Council will grant consent under clause 3.1 of the section 173 Agreement, there must be a ‘question’ or application for consent under the section 173 Agreement that has been consciously lodged by the Applicant. It is not enough to infer a question or application for consent from the circumstances because if a party is needing to infer that a question or application has been lodged, then it has not actually been lodged (Tribunal emphasis). As such, in the absence of a question or application, there can be no decision that finds jurisdiction under section 149(1)(b) of the P&E Act.
Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the Council delegate’s report refers to the section 173 Agreement and the lack of consent from the Council, as well there being no evidence of compliance with the requirement in clause 3.1.4 of the section 173 Agreement, none of these matters is equivalent to a decision being made in relation to an application for consent. This is because:
- the first ground of the Refusal and the comments in the Council delegate’s report to be simply statements of fact—the Council has not issued consents under those clauses of the section 173 Agreement in relation to the Applicant’s proposal as contained in the Permit Application;
- a decision to grant consent under the section 173 Agreement will involve consideration of different matters to the permit application, such as the purpose of the section 173 Agreement, and whilst these might overlap with the planning issues assessed in relation to the permit application, they will not be the same; and
- in any event, for the reasons set out above, there has been no application for consent made by the Applicant under the section 173 Agreement.
Accordingly, in the absence of that jurisdictional fact, no proceeding can be lodged under section 149(1)(b) of the P&E Act.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Section 173 Agreements
8. Changing a mediated outcome: Tribunal reaffirms The King David School case principles
It may be recalled that in The King David School v Stonnington CC & Ors (includes Summary) (Red Dot) [2011] VCAT 520, as well as in Marone Pty Ltd Joint Venture v Glen Eira CC & Ors (includes Summary) (Red Dot) [2011] VCAT 1650, the Tribunal held that it is not appropriate to divert from the component of the mediated settlement that is sought to be altered by an amendment to a permit.
In Herrmann v Hobsons Bay CC [2025] VCAT 374, a permit was issued following a Tribunal consent order for the construction of an additional dwelling, front fence, the demolition of a shed and fencing and a reduction in car parking.
As part of the mediated agreement, an amended plans condition required the removal of a sliding door from the study/retreat area. The Council required this permit condition on the basis that it was concerned this area could otherwise be used as a third bedroom, which would have required a larger car parking waiver, noting that no on site car parking is proposed for this second dwelling.
The Applicant now proposed a range of amendments to the endorsed plans, which includes the reapplication of a sliding door to this room, and removal of the adjacent balustrade.
Having regard to the two authorities cited above, the Tribunal found:
- the Applicant has failed to identify any good or sound reason why this component of the mediated outcome should be undone. That is, there is no change in circumstances or physical context that has been identified that would justify a departure from the agreed position;
- the Applicant has not identified any change in market conditions, or any change regarding the detailed design and construction process, that would necessitate this amendment; and
- the Applicant has not identified any change to the Hobsons Bay Planning Scheme that would justify the Applicant seeking a different outcome from that previously agreed to between the parties. Instead, this simply appears to be a second attempt by the Applicant to obtain approval for an original component of the proposal, that was agreed to be changed by the mediated outcome that lead to the grant of a planning permit.
The Tribunal allowed the application in part and required the amended plans to be further amended to remove the sliding door to the first floor study/rumpus, and add an open balustrade to part of the interface with the adjacent stairwell.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Permit > Amendment to permit after original permit granted
9. Is a Childcare centre prohibited under the Melbourne Airport Environs Overlay allowed under Clause 43.01-9 of the Heritage Overlay
In Salnando Superannuation Pty Ltd v Brimbank CC [2025] VCAT 366, a declaration was sought as to whether a proposed childcare centre in a historic church was permitted.
The church is located in the Melbourne Airport Environs Overlay (MAEO) and in the Heritage Overlay (HO) Education centre is a prohibited use in the MAEO.
Clause 43.01-9 of the HO states that a permit may be granted to use a heritage place (including a heritage place which is included in the Victorian Heritage Register) for a use which would otherwise be prohibited if all of the following apply:
- the schedule to this overlay specifies the heritage place as one where prohibited uses may be permitted;
- the use will not adversely affect the significance of the heritage place; and
- the benefits obtained from the use can be demonstrably applied towards the conservation of the heritage place.
The declaration involved consideration of statutory interpretation principles. Having regard to relevant authorities, the Tribunal summarised the main principles relevant in these proceedings are:
- the starting point is the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words to be interpreted, having regard to context and purpose of the legislation (in these proceedings, the planning scheme) as a whole;
- subordinate instruments (including the planning scheme in these proceedings) should be construed in light of practical considerations, having regard to use by practical people skilled in a particular industry; and
- the meaning of words in a planning scheme is to be ascertained in their context, whether or not the relevant provisions raise an ambiguity or inconsistency.
Noting that there is not a prevailing provision, in that the apparent inconsistency is not resolved by either an express provision that the MAEO1 requirement prevails over the HO prohibited uses exemption, or an express provision that the HO prohibited uses exemption does not apply if the prohibition arises under the MAEO1 requirement, the Tribunal found:
- there appears to be an inconsistency between the MAEO1 requirement and the HO prohibited uses exemption;
- after reading the planning scheme so as to resolve the apparent inconsistency, both the MAEO1 requirement and the HO prohibited uses exemption apply as to their terms;
- a child care centre is not a ‘prohibited use’ (or more specifically is not a use ‘which would otherwise be prohibited’) under Clause 43.01-9;
- no permission to use the subject land for a child care centre is required under Clause 43.01-9;
- the subject land must not be used for a child care centre under MAEO1 and this prevents the grant of permission to use the subject land for a child care centre, even if there were no grounds to refuse permission having regard only to the NRZ; and
- if the subject land cannot be used for a child care centre, permission to develop the subject land for a child care centre under the NRZ and HO must not be granted.
The Tribunal therefore made a declaration that the correct interpretation of the planning scheme is that:
- a child care centre is not a prohibited use for the purposes of Clause 43.01-9 having regard to the NRZ and the meaning and effect of MAEO1; and
- the subject land must not be used for a child care centre under MAEO1.
The Tribunal stated [57]:
… the distinction in choice of words might appear at first to be semantic, but on careful analysis it is not semantic. The distinction is consistent with the interpretation principle of giving effect to the words actually used.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Childcare centre , Victoria Planning Provisions > Inconsistency between provisions of the planning scheme