VCAT Volume 12 No 11
1. Planning challenges in assessing Moveable take away food premises
There has been a notable increase of moveable structures selling food and beverages over recent years. Such structure includes shipping containers, converted caravans and other temporary buildings. Some recent proposals have thrown up some interesting planning issues.
In Carringbush Pty Ltd v Yarra Ranges SC [2025] VCAT 458, the Council refused an application for a take away food premises and the construction of a gate. The proposal involved locating a moveable coffee cart to the south-eastern corner of the land. It was proposed to operate seven days a week and sell both food and drink for immediate consumption, though the coffee cart is proposed to be moved off-site for events from time to time, and will be able to access the land through part of the existing fencing being removed and replaced with a gate constructed of similar materials and used only for vehicle access for the coffee cart.
Two of the Council’s grounds of refusal related to the statutory planning provisions applying to the land and two related to the merits of the proposal.
The land is within the Green Wedge A Zone, Schedule 1 (GWAZ), and affected by several overlays, including the Specific Controls Overlay Schedule 14 (SCO14) and the Significant Landscape Overlay, Schedule 1 (SLO1). The purpose of the SCO is ‘to apply specific controls designed to achieve a particular land use and development outcome in extraordinary circumstances’. An Incorporated Document applies to the subject land.
A take away food premises is a permitted use in the Incorporated Document subject to conditions. Council contended because the conditions could not be met the proposal was prohibited. More specifically, the Council submitted that, as the coffee cart is a building, condition 2 requires it to be retrofitted to a bushfire attack level of BAL-29 which is unlikely to be achievable. The Council also submitted that the use was associated with the existing buildings on the larger site and therefore should be clad similarly to the shipping containers on the site. In doing so, the Council noted that it would not necessarily be possible or appropriate to retrofit a moveable food van and noted that BAL-29 is designed for fixed and not moveable structures.
Council’s view was that the coffee cart is a temporary structure and therefore a building, defined in the Building Act 1993 as follows:
building includes structure, temporary building, temporary structure and any part of a building or structure;
Similarly, the Council submitted that that it does not consider the coffee cart to be a building for the purpose of determining whether planning permission is required under the Bushfire Management Overlay (‘BMO’), defined in the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) as follows:
building includes
(a) a structure and part of a building or a structure; and
(b) fences, walls, out-buildings, service installations and other appurtenances of a building; and
(c) a boat or a pontoon which is permanently moored or fixed to land;
On the other hand, the Applicant referred to Clause 73.01 and the definition of ‘Movable building’ as:
A structure, other than a tent, caravan, or vehicle, which is designed to be moved from place to place on more than one occasion.
In response to the various submissions, the Tribunal held that Council’s contention that the coffee cart is a temporary structure and therefore a building is not correct as there is no definition of take away food premises in the Building Act.
The definition of building under the P&E Act, while including a boat or pontoon permanently moored or fixed to land, does not include vehicles, whether permanently in place or in a location temporarily.
The Tribunal found in Unique Food Trucks Pty Ltd v Wyndham CC [2023] VCAT 1205 that a food truck was not a building, stating that:
Council sought to include the food trucks as buildings because of their permanent parking/occupation on the site. However, I find they are movable vehicles or trailers and can be moved at any time. I do not consider they are buildings irrespective of whether they are permanent or movable. [27]
Overall, the Tribunal found that the proposal does meet the condition requirements under the SCO14 and that a take away food premises is not prohibited under the GWAZ.
As to the merits of the proposal, the Tribunal considered that proposal is for a use that will contribute to both the local and tourist economy and retail offering, even if in a minor way, is located within an established activity centre in an established commercial location and will not affect significant landscapes in the area. It is a proposal that is supported by the purpose of the SCO14, will not conflict with the overarching green wedge nature of the area, and the relevant conditions of the incorporated document can be included in a planning permit.
In Hulme v Surf Coast SC [2025] VCAT 456, Council issued a Notice of Decision to Grant a Permit for a take away food premises. The premises was to be provided within a 3.5 metre x 2.44 metre moveable shipping container positioned on a trailer at the front of an existing caravan park.
The permit applicant submitted that the proposed use is appropriate as it is a small-scale commercial use that will support the ongoing viability of the caravan park, will provide a welcomed facility for the local community, will not generate any significant or unacceptable impacts on local residents and is highly sympathetic to the natural environment of Sunset Strip, Jan Juc.
In the absence of specific encouragement or support for non-residential uses in the Low Density Residential Zone (LDRZ), the Tribunal stated that it is fair to say that given the size of the proposed use, the policies of the planning scheme are relevant as ‘high level’ policies. In general, the proposal provides a benefit to the caravan park community as well as the broader community as a small scale operation.
The Tribunal noted that if the proposed use was located within the boundary of the caravan park, such as where the previous kiosk was located in the office building, it could be argued that it was an ancillary use serving a tourism operation. However, it considered the proposed use is a new commercial use in a residential zone. It is not located within the boundary of the caravan park but within the front setback and, it was submitted, intends to attract customers from outside the caravan park.
The Tribunal also noted that, generally, the vision of the planning scheme for low density residential areas, is to maintain this low density character. There is an absence of policies directing the proposed use to this location or to the LDRZ.
Accordingly, other considerations relevant to the physical context for which there is clear planning scheme direction – and a proposal’s required response to them – will assume a higher degree of importance. In setting aside Council’s decision to approve the application, it concluded that:
- the commercial nature of the use every day is an unacceptable intrusion into a residential zone;
- because the proposed coffee van will appeal to people outside the caravan park, it will have a detrimental impact on the neighbours’ amenity;
- the proposed use introduces a new commercial (non-residential) use in a residential zone that cannot be considered ‘orderly planning’; and
- while the existing caravan park experiences periods of high activity during peak seasons, it was accepted that for the remainder of the year the nature of the use is relatively benign.
Overall, the Tribunal found the ambience of the immediate area is one that can be characterised as akin to that experienced in a semi-rural rather than a more urbanised environment.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Building, Moveable building, Take away food premises
2. Is a condition of permit tantamount to a refusal?
In Axolotl Pty Ltd v Glen Eira CC [2025] VCAT 471, the Council approved an apartment building comprising 26 apartments, a front fence exceeding 1.5 metres in height and a reduction of the statutory parking rate by four spaces. The apartment was to be used for student accommodation. A condition of the permit requires the consolidation of apartments so that the maximum number is 22 so that no reduction in the statutory car parking rate is required. Accordingly, the Notice of Decision (NOD) did not refer to Clause 52.06 of the scheme in the list of permissions that were granted.
The Tribunal commented that the process of including a condition so as to remove a permit trigger creates a conundrum for the parties and VCAT. It stated that “Frankly, a fair process would have involved a refusal of the application for permit based on insufficient car parking, being the real issue in dispute in this proceeding.” The following two questions were addressed by the Tribunal:
- Can the application for review be amended under section 127 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (VCAT Act)? and
- If the application for review is amended, should the application for review be the subject of further service?
With respect to the first question, the Tribunal noted that Condition 1 of the permit requires amended plans and documents to be submitted to Council for its endorsement that depict the consolidation of the apartments. Accordingly, the endorsed plans form part of what the permit allows and could form the basis of an application under section 80 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act). The Tribunal noted that “it is fortunate the permit has described what the permit allows by reference to the development in addition to the matters under the scheme for which the permit has been granted.”
Parties to the proceeding urged the Tribunal to follow Townsing v Stonnington CC (No 2) [2022] VCAT 1252 where similar circumstances applied. The Tribunal agreed.
Townsing can be distinguished from Tsourounakis v Cardinia SC (Red Dot) [2024] VCAT 1104 on the basis that the Applicant in Townsing did not ultimately seek any reduction in the statutory car parking rate and thus, that reduction was not considered by the Council at first instance. In Tsourounakis , the Tribunal stated:
It is evident from the material presented that the applicant made a conscious decision to avoid the need for a permit under clause 52.06 because it could not provide the car parking spaces that were required for a greater number of students, and it did not wish to pay the cost of the financial contribution requirement at clause 5.0 of the PO1.
This conscious decision led to the issue of the permit, including condition 3. The applicant now seeks to review a condition which is entirely consistent with the applicant’s amended permit application, and which would consequently result in something that is inconsistent with what was applied for. It seeks to subvert the proper process of seeking a reduction of car parking requirements under clause 52.06 and the PO1.
The actions of the applicant in seeking to review a condition that is consistent with what it applied for, also disregards procedural fairness to the original decision maker, where that decision maker has not had the opportunity to properly consider all relevant factors. Clause 52.06, whilst not a new planning scheme provision, has a lengthy list of matters that must be considered for an application to reduce the car parking requirements. It is evident from the officer’s report that none of these has been considered by the original decision maker in its final assessment because it was not required to, as there was no trigger for consideration of these matters in the first place.
For these reasons, I find that it is not open to me to consider the variation of condition 3 as sought by the applicant in this proceeding because of the limited nature of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in an application for review under section 80 of the PE Act. [56-59]
With respect to the second question, the Tribunal held that, given the process that led to the issue of the permit and the application for review before the Tribunal, the Tribunal agreed with the parties that the application for review should be the subject of further service, and that Council should be responsible for that process.
See also:
- Permit > Amendment to permit > new permit trigger
3. Is a Future Homes project exempt from notice due to its distance from an activity centre?
Practitioners will be aware that following the gazettal of Amendment VC243 in September 2023 Clause 53.24 of the Victoria Planning Provisions was introduced to facilitate residential development standards for exemplar apartment designs under the Future Homes project.
In Glaseden Property Pty Ltd ATO SCS Property Investment Trust v Banyule CC [2025] VCAT 477, a third party sought to be joined to the proceeding on the basis the proposal is within 800 metres of an activity centre (and therefore not meeting one of the exemptions from notice) and because there would be a breach of an existing section 173 Agreement applying to the land.
Interestingly, the Council had refused the application which has resulted in some publicity in the daily media about the ‘one-size fits-all’ element of the Future Homes project.
Parties agreed that the subject land is 730 metres from the Rosanna Neighbourhood Activity Centre (RNAC) ‘as the crow flies’. The party seeking to be joined contended that the land is not within 800 metres of the RNAC and thus, should have been assessed using the ‘usual planning pathway’.
In approaching statutory construction, it is relevant to consider the Interpretation of Law Act 1984 (IL Act). Section 43 of the IL Act states:
Measurement of distances
In the measurement of a distance for the purposes of an Act or subordinate instrument, the distance shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane.
(‘as the crow flies’)
It is also appropriate to consider relevant authorities on statutory construction, which in this case involved the following three questions:
- What does the text of Clause 53.24-1 of the scheme mean and is it necessary to reject the literal or ordinary meaning of Clause 53.24-1?
- What is the purpose of Clause 53.24?
- Does Clause 53.24-1 contain a ‘contrary intention’ so as to displace the meaning of measurement contained in section 43 of the IL Act?
On the first question, the Tribunal held that the mode of measurement in the IL Act provides certainty to the administrators of the scheme as it is practical and logical when compared to a measurement that relies on walkable, trafficable, accessible or practical distance. Contrary to submissions, the Tribunal held that the latter approach could in fact lead to absurd results where land would not have the benefit of Clause 53.24-1 in circumstances where land could physically adjoin the boundary of an activity centre but access to that centre could only occur by some trafficable pathway whose distance is more than 800 metres. Yet, land that is much further away in distance from the activity centre could be assessed under Clause 53.24 because the distance was ‘trafficable’.
On the second question, the Tribunal held the requirement for a decision maker to undertake detailed assessment about the measurement of distance is contrary to the purposes of Clause 53.24 of the scheme, which fundamentally is to ‘To facilitate apartment developments …’
On the third question, the Tribunal held that Clause 53.24-4 and the application requirements are tools to provide the decision maker an overview of various matters including locational attributes of the land in question. Such locational attributes include ‘passenger railway station’ and ‘activity centre’.
With respect to the existing section 173 Agreement, the Tribunal held the proceeding should not be used as the vehicle to raise concerns about any amendment or ending of the section 173 agreement when it does not form part of the application presently before VCAT and the P&E Act provides a separate and discrete process for any such application.
The matter is to proceed to a compulsory conference.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Permit > Application for permit > Notice
4. Energy efficiency standards – BESS v NatHers
Clause 15.01-2L-05 (Environmentally Sustainable Design) of the Merri-bek Planning Scheme instructs the decision maker to consider, as relevant, a sustainable design assessment (including an assessment using BESS, STORM or other methods) for developments including two to nine dwellings.
In Kostandinov Investment Pty Ltd v Merri-bek CC [2025] VCAT 494, which involved an amendment to a permit to remove external shading devices (roller blinds or retractable awnings) located over habitable room windows on the east, north and west elevations of a five triple storey dwelling development, the Applicant provided a National House Energy Rating Scheme (‘NatHers’) assessment to support the removal of the external shading devices.
However, this assessment was not supported by Council which submitted that NatHers is based on an annualised energy load. Council prefers the Built Environment Sustainability Scorecard (BESS) to demonstrate best practice for environmentally sustainable development (ESD). Council refused the amendment to the permit.
Council submitted that a minimum BESS score of 55% should be achieved on the basis that the existing endorsed sustainable design assessment achieves a BESS score of 55% and relevant policy seeks best practice in environmentally sustainable development (‘ESD’) and the following wording in part of condition 6 gives council discretion to achieve equivalent (or greater) ESD outcomes:
Where alternative ESD initiatives are proposed to those specified the Responsible Authority may vary the requirements of this condition at its discretion, subject to the development achieving equivalent (or greater) ESD outcomes in association with the development.
The Tribunal, however, did not support Council’s stance, stating that:
I am not persuaded that the BESS score to be achieved ought to be 55%. The condition imposed by the council in September 2019 states that a minimum 50% BESS score should be achieved. At the determination of the application, council must have been satisfied that a BESS score of 50% would achieve best practice of ESD sought under clause 15.01-2L-05.
The wording contained within condition 6 refers to a built-in council discretion to vary the requirements subject to the development achieving equivalent (or greater) ESD outcomes in the development. However, there is a parameter provided under condition 6(c) that states the sustainable design assessment should ‘continue to achieve a minimum BESS score of 50%’
It would be unfair to the permit holder for the council to apply the built-in council discretion that effectively changes the goal post with regards to the acceptability of the development in relation to ESD. The goal post in this instance has been set as a minimum 50% BESS score and the permit applicant does not seek to challenge the compliance of this. [19-21]
As a result, the Tribunal agreed the Applicant could use a combination of methods to achieve best practice ESD, and not necessarily rely only on external screens. However, this is to exclude Dwelling 1, which the Tribunal noted has significant cooling loads due to its north and west orientation.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Conditions > Environmentally Sustainable Design report
5. Compensation claim dismissed by the Court of Appeal
It may be recalled that in Kingston v Head, Transport for Victoria; Jomaring Pty Ltd v Head, Transport for Victoria [2023] VSC 618 (editorial comment VCAT Vol 11 No 5), the Supreme Court found that section 41(5) of the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (LAC Act) is engaged in the proceedings, such that the compensation payable in respect of the present acquisitions (the relevant date being 29 March 2019) should be reduced due to the previous payments received by the previous claimants in 1984.
The land subject to the dispute was obtained for the Mordialloc Freeway in Dingley.
The Applicants challenged the Court’s decision in Jomaring Pty Ltd v Head, Transport for Victoria [2025] VSCA 128.
The Applicants raised two questions of law on which they sought leave to appeal:
- First, they submitted that the acquisition compensation that they received should not have been reduced by the prescribed amount because the reservation compensation paid by the former Road Construction Authority (RCA) was not paid pursuant to Pt 5 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) as required by section 41(5) of the LAC Act; and
- Secondly, they submitted that the formula in section 41(7) of the LAC Act was incapable of application because the ‘B’ value described in the formula was not ascertainable. They contended that no prescribed amount should be deducted from their acquisition.
In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that:
On Ground 1, in summary:
- the provisions of the P&E Act and LAC Act under consideration must be construed in accordance with accepted principles of statutory construction;
- there is no reason to conclude that the only references to the TCP Act intended by the P&E Act arise where a reference is made to a corresponding previous enactment;
- there is no reason why the payment of reservation compensation under the TCP Act should not be regarded as having the same status, operation and effect under the P&E Act;
- the previous payments are not past events but have continuing significance and effect;
- there is good reason why a thing or circumstance preserved under section 206 of the P&E Act should have the same status, operation and effect under the repealing or amending Act as it did under the repealed or unamended Act; and
- there is nothing in the legislative history or extrinsic material that is inconsistent with the conclusions that have been reached.
On Ground 2, in summary:
- in short, the formula educes the proportion of the affected land the authority has already paid for by reason of the payment of reservation compensation and thereby determines what acquisition compensation should be paid in relation to the residual or carcass value of the affected land when acquired;
- the result is that the authority takes the benefit of any subsequent increased value of the interest in land that it has already paid for through the payment of reservation compensation, and the claimant receives reservation compensation, and on acquisition takes the benefit of any subsequent increase in the market value of the residual or carcass land. There is nothing unfair in such an approach; and
- once the legislative purpose of the formula is understood, it is plain that the B value must be taken to mean the market value of the land at the relevant date for the purposes of the determination of reservation compensation. The formula would make no sense and inevitably produce absurd results if it were otherwise.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Compensation
6. Amendment VC267 – transitional provisions
In Salehi v Maroondah CC [2025] VCAT 502, the permit applicant sought to amend plans under Practice Note PNPE9 – Amendment of plans and applications (PNPE9) that would decrease the front setback of a proposed three double storey dwellings from 7.65 metres to 6 metres. Part of the explanation of the proposed changes proffered by the Applicant was that the “minor adjustments respond to new planning scheme requirements”.
Amendment VC267 came into operation on 31 March 2025.
A practice day hearing was convened to consider whether the transitional provisions of VC267 applied. The transitional provision states:
Clause 55 of this planning scheme, as in force immediately before the approval date of Amendment VC267, continues to apply to:
-
- An application for a planning permit lodged before that date.
- An application for an amendment of a permit under section 72 of the Act, if the original permit application was lodged before that date.
The Applicant argued, inter alia, that the transitional provisions do not apply because as an application for review under section 77 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act), the Applicant is no longer applying for a permit and if the transitional provision was intended to extend to the Tribunal’s consideration in its review jurisdiction there would be an express requirement in the transitional provision directing this to occur.
In holding the transitional provisions applied and that the application should be considered against the Clause 55 provisions before VC267 came into operation, the Tribunal stated that, while the Applicant correctly submitted that the function of a responsible authority concludes upon the making of a decision under section 61 of the P&E Act, this does not result in the permit application (that was the subject of the responsible authority’s decision under review) ceasing to be the very matter upon which the Tribunal must make the preferable decision when its review jurisdiction is enlivened. This was because:
- The functions of the original decision-maker include all relevant duties and powers of the original decision-maker, because pursuant to section 5 of the P&E Act, where there is a reference in a provision of the P&E Act to a planning scheme, it is a reference to the planning scheme as in force from time to time.
- As observed by the Supreme Court in The Sisters Wind Farm Pty Ltd v Moyne Shire Council [2012] VSC 324, planning schemes are of central importance to the planning framework established under the P&E Act. The statutory regime contemplates that the content of planning schemes is not fixed but can be changed in accordance with the procedures set out in the P&E Act.
- And as held by the Tribunal in Estia Health Pty Ltd v Glen Eira CC (Red Dot) [2014] VCAT 994 amendments made to permit applications by the Tribunal during a proceeding do not alter the original effective lodgement date of a permit application for the purposes of applying transitional provisions.
With respect to the additional power to make any amendment it thinks fit to the application for the permit conferred on the Tribunal pursuant to Clause 64(2) of Schedule 1 to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Act 1998 (VCAT Act), the Tribunal held this is a discretionary power and does not confer any right on a permit applicant to amend the permit application the subject of the review proceeding before the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the power conferred on the Tribunal under clause 64(2) is distinguishable from the opportunity provided to a permit applicant under section 50 of the P&E Act.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Transitional provisions
7. Is a place of worship an urban use?
Religious congregations find it extremely difficult to find sites to establish places of worship in emerging growth areas because of the high cost of land. Many congregations therefore need to find alternative areas, such as underutilised industrial areas or rural areas.
In Werribee Karen Baptist Community Inc v Greater Geelong CC [2025] VCAT 524, the Council had refused an application to construct a Place of worship in the Farming Zone in Little River, a township located between Werribee and Geelong.
Council submitted that the proposal is contrary to policy at Clause 11.01 of the Greater Geelong Planning Scheme, as it would allow an urban use of land to be established in the Farming Zone surrounded by agricultural land uses. The Council also submitted that the land use is inappropriate as it is not associated with an agricultural land use, and could potentially be in conflict with surrounding agricultural uses, contrary to the purposes and decision guidelines of the Farming Zone.
The Tribunal was not persuaded that the use of land for a Place of worship is solely an urban use of land, and is therefore unsuitable in this rural setting. It had addressed this matter in Ross v Frankston CC [2017] VCAT 274, where it was stated [48]:
Finally, it is the submission of the Applicant that the proposal is for an urban land use that will fundamentally change the appearance of the review site. A Place of worship and a Place of assembly can be considered as an urban, regional or rural land use. The needs for a Place of worship and a Place of assembly exists in all of these contexts.
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that a Place of worship can be an appropriate use of land in the Farming Zone, on the right piece of land, and in the right context. If this were not the case, it stated that a Place of worship would be a prohibited land use in the Farming Zone.
In response to third party objector submissions that the congregation seeking the permit was located outside the municipality of Greater Geelong, the Tribunal stated:
Just because the current congregation travel from a town other than Little River, does not mean that in the future they will not contribute to the local community in some way. In any case, under the decision guidelines of the Farming Zone and the policy at Clause 14.01-1L-01 of the Greater Geelong Planning Scheme, the proposal does not need to serve a local need or make a contribution to the local area, in order to be granted a planning permit. For this reason I cannot give any substantive weight to these submissions. [19]
The Tribunal also found the review site at two hectares cannot provide a role for providing an agricultural use. It considered that the land that is available for agriculture is so small, as to not be able to support a viable or meaningful agricultural enterprise, without substantial investment in a very intensive operation. The fact that this has not occurred to date, and noting the broadacre form of agriculture that currently occurs on surrounding land, provided a strong suggestion that a very intensive form of agriculture is unlikely to be established on the review site in the future.
Finally, the Tribunal found the proposal is consistent with policy at Clause 14.01-1L-01 of the Greater Geelong Planning Scheme, which intends to support discretionary uses in the Farming Zone if certain outcomes are achieved. It concluded that:
- the intensity of the proposed land use is very low, occurring mostly on a Sunday, and as such will be a land use that will not create a conflict for surrounding agricultural land uses;
- the existing agricultural activity on surrounding land comprises broadacre farming, that would not be compromised by the proposed Place of worship;
- the scale of the proposed development is low, and will cover a small proportion of the review site;
- the review site has access to a sealed road, which is capable of accommodating the additional traffic associated with the proposed land use; and
- the site has access to all necessary servicing infrastructure, and that a septic system can service the proposed Place of worship.
Your editors note that under current market conditions and the planning framework applying in growth areas that applications for places of worship in rural areas will not be uncommon.
See also:
- Guide to Planning Appeals: Place of worship