VCAT Volume 11 No 4

1. Ashburton Residents’ challenge to Minister’s powers on Homes Victoria development dismissed

In Ashburton Residents Action Group Inc. v Minister for Planning [2023] VCAT 1136, a local resident group concerned with lack of consultation and changes to a Homes Victoria development have failed in their application for declaratory relief.

The land was originally developed with several dwellings within nine double storey buildings used for social housing and known as the ‘Markham Housing Estate’. In 2021, redevelopment of the land commenced for 178 dwellings comprising a mix of social and affordable housing offering one, two and three bedroom dwellings. The redevelopment comprises five buildings of varying heights across the land.

The development was approved by a planning scheme amendment approved under section 20(4) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act). Whilst there was no statutory opportunity to lodge submissions to the Amendment, the Council sought comments from residents as part of their consideration of the Amendment.

The development must meet the requirements of an Incorporated Document that was approved by the Amendment. Plans must be approved by the Minister. The Incorporated Document has no requirements to consult with third parties.

The local resident group raised concerns with:

  • the lack of consultation with the community;
  • changes in the scheme;
  • incorrect information from the Minister and Homes Vic; and
  • alleged breaches of the development with the Incorporated Document.

The group  submitted the application for declarations has been made by it because no other action by the residents has been able to address alleged breaches of the Incorporated Document. It contended that the Minister’s decision in relation to the C321 was so unreasonable that no responsible authority acting reasonably would have made it. Further, it is said that the Minister failed to take all relevant matters into account.

The Tribunal provided detailed reasons to each of the 11 grounds contained in the declaration application. As to lack of consultation, process, changes in the scheme over time and incorrect information, it stated:

Whilst it is trite to say, I must apply the scheme at the time of my decision and not at some previous time. Whilst the planning history of the land is clearly of importance to ARAG, and sets the context and background to this application, it cannot distract me from the task of applying the scheme as I find it. Therefore, to the extent ARAG relies on previous amendments such as C251 and C298 and what was said about these that was accurate or inaccurate, is of little consequence to the determination of this application. Further, information regarding the residential zone reforms is not relevant to a consideration of declaratory relief that is sought.

Having said that, I acknowledge that a lack of clarity and focus about such a large development causes confusion, frustration and general distrust of the process, particularly for those who live in close proximity to the development.

I understand ARAG’s frustration at the various sets of endorsed plans, although I hasten to add that it is common for a project of this magnitude. There is often a refinement of development as it progresses through to and throughout construction. I also note the timing of the last amendment to the plans was in February 2023 sometime after this proceeding was commenced. [178-180]

Whilst the Tribunal considered it abundantly clear that from the material relied upon by the parties, there had been correspondence and dialogue between Council, residents, and various representatives from government and Homes Victoria, it stated “it necessary to note” that the local residents group was required to obtain copies of endorsed documents under the Freedom of Information Act. It further stated:

Whether that process is correct or not, it has led to ARAG’s sense of justified frustration in the planning process and delay in bringing this proceeding. The reason for the delay may have been relevant, if I considered a declaration was appropriate.

Practitioners will be aware that pursuant to section 70 of the P&E Act the responsible authority must make a copy of every permit that it issues available in accordance with the public availability requirements. However, the Incorporated Document applying to the subject land has no requirements for a planning permit: plans must be merely submitted and approved by the responsible authority which may be subject to conditions. Not providing residents access to endorsed plans, which for all intents and purposes are part of a permit, is against the intent of section 70.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Natural justice, Ministerial decision

2. Is a further information request about the need for educational facilities valid for a subdivision application?

The City of Wyndham holds concerns about the lack of schools in the growth areas of its municipality. In 2020, it opposed an application for a residential subdivision on a site that was identified as a ‘future non-government school’ in an approved PSP in ID Woods Road Pty Ltd v Wyndham CC [2020] VCAT 969.

In Intrapac Ellarook Pty Ltd v Wyndham CC [2023] VCAT 1150, which involved an application to amend a permit for a residential subdivision on a potential government school site in the Truganina PSP, the Council ought further information under section 54(1) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act), comprising:

  • a social infrastructure impact assessment (SIIA) which includes modelling and empirical data to support the removal of the school site;
  • reports and documentation to support that the subject land is not required by all government and non-government school providers;
  • evidence of how the amendment application meets Clause 19.02-2S Education facilities considering existing and future demographic trends, existing and future demand requirements for the area; and
  • evidence of how the amendment application supports an expansion of the range of educational facilities in response to growth in the area to meet Clause 19.02-2L Education facilities.

Whilst the Council did not pursue the last two items at the Hearing, the Tribunal held the request was not reasonable or necessary. It stated:

The further information sought does not concern the proposed residential subdivision of the site. Instead, I find that the enquiries are directed at ‘flushing out’ whether there may be some other need for, or use of, the site (by non-government school providers), in circumstances where it has received a clear statement that the site is not required for the specific purpose identified in the PSP (being a government primary school). [15]

And further:

While I accept that Council has a very real concern that there may or will be an undersupply of education facilities in a fast-growing growth area, I am not persuaded that it is necessary of reasonable, for the purpose of considering a residential subdivision of the land, that an applicant demonstrate the impacts of not providing some other possible use or development of the site (in the form of a SIIA).

I also agree that the need to provide some written indication from “all government and non-government school providers” that that there is no requirement for the school site as sought by the RFI request is excessive and unreasonable in the context of a site that is identified for use as a potential government primary school site. The application is accompanied by correspondence that confirms that the relevant agency, being the DET has no interest in taking up the site for development as a government primary school. [18-19]

In reaching its decision, the Tribunal referred to the relevant principles in relation to the operation of section 54 as expressed in Calodoukas v Moreland CC (includes Summary) (Red Dot) [2010] VCAT 498.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Permit > Application for planning permit > Further information > Relevance of information

3. Hotel’s existing use rights upheld

In Insite Architects Pty Ltd v Kingston CC [2023] VCAT 1076, the Tribunal considered a number of preliminary questions on whether a hotel has existing use rights.

Whilst both parties agreed that the land has been used for over 150 years for the purposes of a hotel, and there was no disagreement as to the activities conducted as part of that use or that the whole of the land enjoyed the existing use right, both parties had differing positions on the application of Clause 63.11 and from when existing use rights should be calculated.

Council asserted that, because of a permit issued in 2007 to extend trading hours, which included a number of conditions, the permit (and the conditions contained therein) comprises a restriction on the existing use rights enjoyed by the hotel for the purposes of Clause 63.05.

Council’s interpretation of the phrase in Clause 63.11 ‘for 15 years prior to the date of the application or proceeding’ limits the ‘application’ referred to as one made under section 97N of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act), and as such the calculation of the 15 year period is prior to the commencement of this proceeding on 21 July 2022.

On the other hand, the Applicant contended that the relevant 15 year period is calculated from the date of lodgement of the permit application to Council, which was 6 September 2021.

In dismissing Council’s contentions, the Tribunal stated:

There is no proper basis to limit the word ‘application’ in the way submitted by Council. When read in its full context, and noting the opening words of clause 63.11, the word ‘application’ means an application made under the Act or the scheme and includes, but is not limited to, an application under s.97N of the Act. It can include an application for planning permit made under s.47 of the Act.

The reference to a ‘proceeding’ in the opening words of clause 63.11 provides for those matters that come before the Tribunal by way of an originating application such as applications made under s.149A or s.149B of the Act that are not preceded by an application under the Act or the scheme. [47-48]

Having settled the question on when existing use rights are to be calculated, the Tribunal then determined three questions in dispute:

  • Question 1 – does the red line plan, or any condition in the Liquor Licence or planning permit, constitute a condition or restriction on the use of the land for a hotel for the purposes of the second dot point at Clause 63.05?
  • Question 2 – does the proposal constitute a change in the activities beyond the limit of the use preserved by the existing use right for the purposes of the third dot point at Clause 63.05?
  • Question 3 – is a permit required under Cause 52.27 of the Kingston Planning Scheme by reason of the proposed modification to the red line plan and liquor licence approved under the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998, having regard to the existing use rights that apply to the hotel?

On question 1, the Tribunal held that a permit was not required  to be obtained in 2007 under Clause 52.27 in order for the hotel to increase its trading hours and that the hotel does not need to rely on that permit for the increase in trading hours.

On question 2, the Tribunal held that the third dot point of Cause 63.05 does not apply to any changes in activities that are activities in furtherance of the purpose of the existing use established under Clause 63.01. This was made clear by the Tribunal in Wellington v Surf Coast SC (includes Summary) (Red Dot) [2011] VCAT 2317, which stated that the expression “change in activities beyond the limited purpose if the use” must mean a change in the activities that amounts to a change in the purpose of the use. This had not occurred here.

On question 3, the Tribunal agreed with the determination made by the Tribunal in Kevak Hotels Pty Ltd v Darebin CC (Corrected) [2022] VCAT 318 regarding the (non) application of Clause 52.27 to existing uses for which the sale and consumption of liquor is an activity that is conducted as part of the purpose of the preserved existing use.

Underpinning the Tribunal’s reasons on this question was its view that Clause 52.27 is a land use control within the scheme. It stated an application for a permit under section 47 of the P&E Act, must be one for the use and/or development of land: it cannot require a permit ‘activities’ or for ‘changes in circumstances’ or for ‘matters’. Therefore, Clause 52.27 must either be a land use control or a development control because it requires a permit to be obtained in certain circumstances and a permit can only be required for the use or development of land. It further stated:

I agree with Deputy President Dwyer’s comments in McKinnon Hotels Pty Ltd v Glen Eira CC that a permit could conceivably be refused and the permit requirement in clause 52.27 would impose a fetter on the Olympic Hotel’s existing use rights. The requirement to obtain a permit inherently confers the power to prevent the use or development the subject of the permit application. It is no answer to say that clause 52.27 does not prevent the continuance of the existing use of a hotel and merely ‘regulates’ the sale and consumption of liquor. 

Such form of regulation is contrary to preservation of existing use rights once established which includes the right to intensify without further need to obtain a further permit (established in Norman v Gosford Shire Council [1975] HCA 15). In addition, it would impose an impermissible fetter on the discretion to be exercised by a responsible authority and the Tribunal in determining any application under that clause. Such a fetter requires a legislative basis and one does not presently exist. [128-129]

See also: 

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Existing use rights > Licensed premises

4. When a refusal may have been more appropriate than a condition

Two sites (in the one ownership) in Portsea have beach frontage. Whilst the sites are privately owned, they are partly in the Public Conservation and Resource Zone which triggered a retrospective application for the laying of turf and sub-surface irrigation. Council granted the permit but the following condition was challenged in Kooroora Developments Pty Ltd v Mornington Peninsula SC [2023] VCAT 1083:

The replanting of the turfed area with native species indigenous to the Coastal Dune Grassland (EVC 879) and/or Coastal Dune Scrub (EVC160) Ecological Vegetation Classes.

Troubled by the nature of the condition given what was approved, the Tribunal stated:

The permits are in my view internally contradictory. They give permission for the development of turf, but then require the replacement of the ‘turfed area’ in condition 1(a). If Council did not want to legitimise the turf that exists, they could have refused the permit applications and contested any review on the full weight of policy that was identified during this proceeding. [27]

The Tribunal acknowledged that replanting of the subject area with coastal native vegetation of suitable EVCs may be a better outcome in terms of coastal habitat and conservation, but if this is what was sought it arguably should have been considered during the decision to issue the permit, and not left to be achieved via condition.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Conditions > Validity of conditions

5. Appropriateness of indoor recreational facilities in employment and industrial areas

Many employment and industrial areas throughout metropolitan Melbourne have an array of indoor recreational facilities such as gymnasiums and cricket, basketball and netball courts. Such areas are attractive to operators because they are likely cheaper to rent, have minimal amenity impacts because of the absence of residents and have availability of car parking.

On the other side of the coin, locating such facilities in activity centres is an opportunity lost to introduce more vibrancy to such centres, especially in growth areas where lack of diversity of uses limit their attractiveness.

There have been two recent cases for indoor recreation facilities, with one approved and one refused.

In Thuliwal Transport Pty Ltd v Wyndham CC [2023] VCAT 1135, the Council had refused an application for the use of the land for a dance school. The site is in Urban Growth Zone 2 (Applied Zone: Commercial 2 Zone) in the Laverton North and Truganina Employment Precinct for industrial development. In setting aside Council’s refusal, the Tribunal stated:

I further find that this land use is supported by the relevant policy context, noting that it is a commercial land use in an applied commercial zone, and will create employment in a location earmarked for a range of employment generating uses. It is therefore consistent with the Economic growth policies from Clause 02.03-7 of the Wyndham Planning Scheme. It is also relevant to note that the review site at 128 square metres of footprint, is a very small tenancy, that is unlikely to host a land use that generates a significant amount of employment. [8]

Further, the Tribunal considered that while a restaurant/function centre and a place of worship may be considered land uses not promoting orderly planning in an industrial zone, it is a stretch to then say this leads one to the conclusion that a small dance studio in a commercial zone also does not support orderly planning.

In Sansai Electronics Pty Ltd v Greater Dandenong CC [2023] VCAT 1130, the Tribunal upheld a Council refusal for the use of an existing industrial building as a indoor recreational facility (badminton facility). The industrial building is in an industrial area but in the Commercial2 Zone (C2Z))

The Tribunal noted there are a number of non-commercial/industrial activities within the C2Z within close proximity to the site, including an indoor playground and trampoline park, a place of worship, and within the estate where the site is situated an adult education centre.

The Tribunal further noted that these examples are of out of centre uses which have been established within the C2Z and appear to be operating without significant conflict with the surrounding industrial and commercial uses. In addition to these uses, the Council has recently approved the establishment of a badminton centre on nearby land, which is also included within the C2Z.

The subject site is located at the rear of an industrial estate and accessed via a common property driveway. Whilst the car parking spaces are generally unmarked on site, it was common ground at the Hearing that they are in fact allocated to the various tenancies within the complex via a licence agreement.

Council submitted that the number of spaces is inadequate for the intensity of the proposed use, and their location will lead to conflict between pedestrians trying to access the badminton centre and the vehicles used for the other premises such as trucks and forklifts. There are no footpaths in the vicinity of the proposed centre, except for a small footpath near the entrance of the facility, and as such a pedestrian will need to walk along some distance to access the entry to the facility, which is located at the eastern end of the site, away from the majority of the spaces allocated to the site. This situation was fatal to the application:

I find that there is a real potential for vehicles to conflict with pedestrians on this site, and this is issue is not easily overcome. [23]

Whilst there are significant physical and safety issues in Sansai Electronics Pty Ltd that led to a refusal, it would appear the indoor recreational facilities and other non-core industrial and commercial uses will continue to be a feature in employment and industrial areas.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Indoor recreational facility

6. Court of Appeal rules refusal of extension to permit invalid

There have been a number of different proceedings at both VCAT and in the Supreme Court involving a 50 metre high building approved in the Moonee Valley Major Activity Centre. These proceedings have concerned whether an amendment to the permit should be approved and whether an extension to the permit should be granted.

In the most recent proceeding, Mondib Pty Ltd v Coral Rise Pty Ltd [2023] VSCA 237, the permit applicant sought leave in the Court of Appeal on three grounds of appeal:

Ground 1 – the Tribunal made an error of law in concluding that a change in the planning controls affecting the subject land was a consideration that the Council was bound to take into account in determining whether to extend the time for an existing permit under section 69 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act).

Ground 2 – the exercise by the Tribunal of its discretion to make a declaration under section 149B of the P&E Act that the second extension was invalid and of no effect and was legally unreasonable.

Ground 3 – the Tribunal made an error of law in concluding that, as a consequence of the invalidity of the second extension, the permit had expired and was incapable of amendment.

The matter was considered by the Court of Appeal against a decision of the President of the Tribunal, Mondib Group Pty Ltd v Moonee Valley CC [2023] VCAT 369.

The permit applicant failed on the first two grounds, but was successful on the third ground.

In relation to Ground 1, the Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal was correct when it followed Turner (t/as Echuca Steam Tramway) v Horsfall [2002] VSC 195 and held that in determining the extension application made by Mondib, it was bound to consider the current state of the planning scheme at the time when the extension application was considered including the height control change effected by Amendment C183. The amendment introduced a mandatory height control of 32m over the subject land.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal distinguished mandatory considerations such as the current state of the relevant planning scheme at the time when the extension application is determined, from relevant considerations, such as strategic plans, policy statements, codes or guidelines adopted by a Minister, government department, public authority or municipal council. This was consistent with the approach in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24.

In relation to Ground 2, the Court of Appeal held that the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal to declare the second extension to be invalid and of no effect had both an evident and intelligible justification for the reasons given by the Tribunal. In particular, the failure was a failure by the Council in its capacity as the responsible authority and decision-maker to consider the planning scheme amendment that changed the height controls.

In relation to Ground 3, the Court of Appeal held the Tribunal erred on a question of law when it decided that, because of the invalidity of the second extension decision, the permit had expired and was incapable of amendment. It stated:

In our view, there is nothing in s 69 or any other relevant provision of the Act that would preclude the ordinary operation of the Bhardwaj (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597)) principle in the context of applications to extend permits. To the contrary, it would be most unfair and unjust if a permit-holder were to lose the benefit of a permit because of a jurisdictional error on the part of a responsible authority in considering the extension application. This consideration points strongly to the need in these circumstances for a responsible authority to be able to revisit its decision and make a proper decision according to law. Section 69(3) of the Act expressly contemplates that a decision to extend a permit may be made after the permit has expired. [75]

As a result of the above finding, the second extension application was remitted to the Council under section 130(2)(e) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 Act for determination in accordance with law.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Permits > Extension of permit

7. Supreme Court dismisses appeal that Tribunal did not consider relevant matters

In another case involving relevant considerations and the National Trust principle, the Supreme Court has dismissed an appeal lodged by a third party, the operator of a Major Hazard Facility, who had objected to an application for a subdivision. The matter had been summarily dismissed by the Tribunal in Viva Energy Australia v Greater Geelong CC (Red Dot) [2022] VCAT 326 on the basis that the purpose of Clause 43.02 and DDO18 did not encompass the safety concerns raised by the operator’s objection.

In Viva Energy Australia Pty Ltd v City of Greater Geelong Council & Anor [2023] VSC 586, the Applicant appealed on the following two grounds:

Ground 1 alleged legal error in holding that the purpose of DDO18 is limited to ‘assessing whether a proposed subdivision is acceptable in light of the relevant land’s location within the Precinct’ because, in reaching that holding, the Tribunal failed to properly construe DDO18 and the purposes to which it is directed.

Ground 2 alleged legal error in holding:

  • that only matters relevant to the purpose of DDO18 may be taken into account under Clause 65.02 of the planning scheme; and
  • that safety matters could not be taken into account under Clause 65.02 when assessing an application for a permit for subdivision under DDO18.

On Ground 1, the Court held there is nothing in the text or context of DDO18 and the head clause of Clause 43 that identify safety issues arising from surrounding land use as relevant to a discretion to permit a subdivision under that particular Design and Development Overlay. It stated:

Consistent with what was said in Sweetvale Pty Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2001] VSC 426 and in Boroondara City Council v 1045 Burke Road Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 27, the issue for determination was not whether a responsible authority had to exercise a discretion in relation to all appropriate matters identified within cl 65.02 going to safety risks arising from proximity to the terminal and pipeline, but whether those matters were relevant to the particular discretion exercised under DDO18. To the extent that safety issues were encompassed by the considerations in cl 65.02, it is clear that those considerations arise in the context of land use. The permission required under DDO18 did not touch on land use directly.

There is a distinction in the text between cl 43.02 and cl 33.02 of the planning scheme. As can be seen from the extracts above, cl 33.02 expressly provides that a purpose of the control is that activity be conducted in a manner that does not affect ‘safety and amenity’. By contrast cl 43.02-6 does not mention safety. It provides a number of specific considerations broadly addressing particular aspects of visual amenity going to built form: heritage, character and appearance of buildings and streetscape. Amenity as a wider consideration is found in DDO18, encompassing other considerations of visual amenity as well as introducing the concept of a ‘high amenity industrial area’. [121-122]

On Ground 2, the Court held the Tribunal did not err in its construction of the way in which Clause 65.02 is relevant to the rights of an objector under the specific permit trigger of DDO18. It stated:

Viva’s first constructional argument is that cl 65 stands alone in its own right within cl 43.02, so that a matter within cl 65 is necessarily one within the purpose of the discretion under the relevant DDO. This argument would have the effect of opening up to an objector any matters relevant to the subdivision that the responsible authority must consider in the broadest sense. Such an interpretation is not consistent with exemptions from review of some permissions and is not a construction that would lead to a ‘reasonably practicable result’.[65] The alternative construction that it enlarges matters to be considered within the discretion can be accepted. In effect the Tribunal decided as much.

The Tribunal’s construction is consistent with the statement of Garde AJA in 1045 Burke Rd as set out above at [57]-[59]. In my view the Tribunal did not err in its construction of relationship between cl 43 and cl 65.02. [145-146]

Leave was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: National Trust principle > Relevance of specific clauses and decision guidelines in the planning scheme with control trigger