VCAT Volume 12 No 12

1. Should car parking constraints limit the number of gymnasium patrons? A curious situation within the planning scheme

In Derrimut 247 Gym (Vic) Pty Ltd v Port Phillip CC [2025] VCAT 568, the Applicant sought a declaration under section 149(1)(a) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) challenging the imposition of a condition that applies a patron limit to a gymnasium, which is tied to the car parking provided for the gymnasium.

The subject land is in the Capital City Zone – Schedule 1 Fishermans Bend Urban Renewal Area (CCZ1) and is subject to the Parking Overlay – Schedule 1 Fishermans Bend Urban Renewal Area (PO1), as well as a number of other overlays.

The gymnasium is to be provided in an existing building that had been previously used for industrial purposes.

Under the CCZ1, a permit is not required for the gymnasium (defined as a Restricted Recreation Facility). However, the declaration was sought in relation to a ‘condition’ imposed on a consent letter Council issued that car parking must be to its satisfaction under Clause 52.06-6.

Clause 52.06 (Car parking) applies to ‘gymnasium’, however the table in Clause 52.06-5 of the planning scheme does not specify a parking rate for this land use. Further, PO1 also does not specify a parking rate for this land use.

As such, car parking must be provided to the satisfaction of the responsible authority in accordance with Clause 52.06-6 of the Scheme, as follows:

Where a use of land is not specified in Table 1 or where a car parking requirement is not specified for the use in another provision of the planning scheme or in a schedule to the Parking Overlay, before a new use commences or the floor area or site area of an existing use is increased, car parking spaces must be provided to the satisfaction of the responsible authority. This does not apply to the use of land for a temporary portable land sales office located on the land for sale. [Tribunal emphasis]

Clause 52.06-7 contains decision guidelines for applications to reduce the car parking requirement of Clause 52.06-5 of the Scheme. However, because the use is not specified in Clause 52.06-5, these decision guidelines do not apply to the consideration of a consent sought under Clause 52.06-6 of the scheme.

The Applicant’s planning witness observed that the combination of the restrictions imposed by the PO1 and the as-of-right uses in the CCZ1 results in:

… a curious situation whereby a new use listed within Table 1 to Clause 52.06- 5 would not require a permit to provide zero car spaces and would be unrestricted in this regard, yet a Section 1 use which is not listed and which has 33 car spaces available is sought to be restricted apparently on the basis of local car parking demand. 

So, on one hand an office development for 500 employees with no car parking would be acceptable, yet a restricted recreation facility which can cater for 500 patrons and has 33 car spaces available is unacceptable. These two lines of thought simply do not align and the present case highlights how illogical this is, particularly in regard to uses in Section 1 of the Zone.

In approaching its task, despite there being no decision guidelines for a decision under Clause 52.06-6, the Tribunal stated this does not mean that I am ‘at large’ in what should be considered in assessing what is, in effect, a form of permission, given that without the car parking being to the satisfaction of the responsible authority, the use of the gymnasium cannot proceed.

 Rather, given clause 52.06-6 is contained in clause 52.06, I find that it is relevant to consider the purpose of clause 52.06, being:

To ensure that car parking is provided in accordance with the Municipal Planning Strategy and the Planning Policy Framework.

To ensure the provision of an appropriate number of car parking spaces having regard to the demand likely to be generated, the activities on the land and the nature of the locality.

To support sustainable transport alternatives to the motor car.

To promote the efficient use of car parking spaces through the consolidation of car parking facilities.

To ensure that car parking does not adversely affect the amenity of the locality.

 To ensure that the design and location of car parking is of a high standard, creates a safe environment for users and enables easy and efficient use. [Tribunal emphasis]

Further, the Tribunal considered that, given that use as a gymnasium is not included in Table 1, PO1 is not relevant to the decision and the PO1 has no work to do with respect to the parking rates that apply to the gymnasium use. It stated that:

In short, whilst I accept that the first purpose of clause 52.06 is to ensure that car parking is provided in accordance with the Municipal Planning Strategy and the Planning Policy Framework, it cannot be that giving effect to that purpose is akin to the PO1 regulating the car parking for the use because this would undermine the PO1 where it does apply.

However, that is not to say that the car parking provision on the Land, and the associated Patron Limit Condition, might not be appropriate having regard to the demand assessment and the existing public transport and alternative transport available to the Land; just that the source of this justification is not the FBUR Area policy in the Scheme. That is, in the circumstances I find that the quantum of car parking to be provided on the Land, and whether this be done with or without the Patron Limit Condition, needs to be justified having regard to the car parking demand assessment [153-154]

Having regard to the car parking demand assessment, the Tribunal found that, although the car parking demand for the gymnasium will not be met by the car parking spaces that are provided on the land, the car parking demand for the gymnasium will be met by the on-street parking spaces surrounding the land. It therefore agreed to delete the condition.

The Tribunal’s decision also addresses the relevance of the planning scheme in a declaratory proceeding under section 149(1)(a) of the P&E Act, having regard to Mondib Pty Ltd v Coral Rise Pty Ltd [2023] VSCA 237 and the role of the Tribunal to make the ‘correct’ or ‘preferable’ decision having regard to Mond v Perkins Architects Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] VSC 455.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Car parking > Applications to reduce car parking for certain uses and developments

2. Relevance of the Bellarine Peninsula Statement of Planning Policy in assessing a helicopter landing site

It may be recalled that in Ramsay v Queenscliffe BC [2024] VCAT 1079, the Tribunal determined several preliminary questions that affect the scope of matters relevant to a helicopter landing site. The Tribunal found that:

  • the proposed use is ancillary to the existing dominant use of the subject land for the purposes of a dwelling house;
  • the proposed use does not require permission under Clause 35.06-1 of the planning scheme; the only permission required under the planning scheme is that required under Clause 52.15-1; and
  • certain provisions under the Rural Conservation Zone, Environmental Significance Overlay, Bushfire Management Overlay, as well as a number of state and local policies in the Planning Policy Framework, were not relevant.

Further, the Tribunal found that:

  • grounds based on environmental impacts or environmental matters could not be raised independently under Clause 65 of the planning scheme or section 60(1)(e) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) for the detailed reasons given in Booth v Strathbogie SC [2023] VCAT 782; and
  • the scope of discretion conferred under Clause 52.15 does not extend to the consideration of the proposal on environmental values, including those matters that may arise under Clause 65 of the planning scheme and section 60(1)(e) of the P&E Act.

As a result of the above determination, there remained two key matters to be determined:

  • whether to grant permission under Clause 52.15-1 of the planning scheme for use of the subject land as a helicopter landing site; and
  • whether the provisions of the Bellarine Peninsula Statement of Planning Policy (BPSPP) are relevant to the Tribunal’s determination in this proceeding.

These two matters were considered by the Tribunal in Ramsey v Queenscliffe BC [2025] VCAT 555.

The first question identified by the Tribunal is whether the Tribunal is ‘a responsible public entity’. It stated:

I endorsed the observations of Deputy President Bisucci in Kyneton Project Management Pty Ltd v Macedon Ranges SC [2022] VCAT 825 that the definition of ‘responsible public entity’ in s 3 of the PE Act does not extend to include the Tribunal in any capacity and that the Tribunal has no role at all in the process described under Part 3AAB of the PE Act. Had Parliament intended otherwise, it would have been incumbent on the legislature to expressly provide for such a capacity to be conferred on the Tribunal in s 3, Part 3AAB or otherwise in the PE Act. I therefore find that the Tribunal is not a ‘responsible public entity’ for the purposes of Part 3AAB of the PE Act and the duties of responsible public entities set out in s 46AZK of the PE Act do not directly apply to the Tribunal. 

In addition, it is significant that the definition of responsible public entity for the purposes of Part 3AAB does not include ‘responsible authority’. [64-65]

The second question as to whether the Tribunal is required to take into account or have regard to the BPSPP when making its determination, it stated:

I confirm my view that the duty imposed on responsible public entities under s 46AZK of the PE Act does not involve the construction of a separate new decision-making process for the purpose of determining permit applications made to responsible authorities involving land within a declared area (under Part 3AAB of the PE Act).

On further consideration, I am of the view that there is considerable doubt that s 84B(1) of the PE Act imposes on the Tribunal the duty imposed on responsible public entities under s 46AZK of the PE Act when determining a review application for the following reasons:

    • The duty imposed under s 46AZK of the PE Act is imposed only on responsible public entities.
    • A responsible authority is not a responsible public entity under s 3 of the PE Act.
    • The decision under review is one made by a responsible authority. Section 84B(1) of the PE Act properly interpreted refers to matters that:
      • the responsible authority took into account or was required to take into account as a responsible authority not those matters required to be taken into account as a responsible public entity; and
      • the responsible authority had regard to or was required to have regard to as the responsibly authority and not those matters required by responsible public entity to take into account when making a decision.
    • The fact that a municipal council may be a responsible authority under cl 72.01 of a planning scheme is not a sufficient basis to apply the requirements s 84B(1) of the PE Act broader than to those matters properly taken into account or to be taken into account by a responsible authority for the purposes of deciding a permit application.
    • Application of s 84B(1) of the PE Act leads to different outcomes depending on who is the specified responsible authority under cl 72.01 of a planning scheme. Where the responsible authority is a municipal council then the collateral obligation under s 46AZK of the PE Act arises. Where the responsible authority is the Minister for Planning or the Chief Executive Officer of a municipal council, then no such obligation under s 46AZK of the PE Act arises because neither the Minister for Planning nor the Chief Executive Officer of a municipal council is a ‘responsible public entity’ under s 3 of the PE Act for the purposes of Part 3AAB of the PE Act. This would be an absurd outcome that is contrary to the decision-making framework applicable to the Tribunal in its review jurisdiction which, once enlivened, is not dependent on the identity of the original decision maker.

Further, the nature of the duty imposed under s 46AZK of the PE Act is at fundamental odds to the discretionary nature of the decision-making under s 84B(1) of the PE Act. While certain things must be either taken into account or regard given to them by the Tribunal under s 84B(1) of the PE Act when arriving at a determination, nothing in s 84B directs a certain outcome be arrived at by the Tribunal in its final determination. To the contrary, s 46AZK imposes a duty on a responsible public entity not to make a decision or perform a function that is inconsistent with a binding objective under a State Planning Policy. If this is the outcome that Parliament sought to impose on the decision-making framework applicable to the Tribunal then it has failed to unambiguously give such a direction to the Tribunal in the PE Act.

The above conclusion is supported by the equally important, but less often quoted, requirements of s 46AZL of the PE Act that sets out how a responsible public entity should discharge its obligations or implement policies or programs or make decisions in relation to a declared area. [73-76]

As to whether the BPSSP is a relevant consideration under Clause 65 of the planning scheme, the Tribunal stated [at 81]:

As the sole permission required under the planning scheme arises under clause 52.15 of the planning scheme, I repeat and rely on the following paragraphs of the preliminary hearing determination limiting the relevant considerations under clause 65 of the planning scheme and s 60 of the PE Act to those matters that are directly relevant to the permissions required under the planning scheme:

When viewed through the lens of the purpose of clause 52.15 the scope of the discretion conferred does not extend to the consideration of the impact of the proposal on environmental values, including those matters that may arise under clause 65 of the planning scheme and s 60(1)(e) of the PE Act.

This is consistent with the approach in Booth and the Supreme Court in Viva Energy Australia Pty Ltd v City of Greater Geelong & Anor [2023] VSC 586 (‘Viva’).

I also note the observation of Forbes J in Viva at [110]:

The fact that the objection is before the responsible authority does not make it relevant to the purpose of the particular discretion. Nor does the fact that it may also fall with (sic) cl 65.02 of itself bring it within the relevant purpose.

The Tribunal approved the grant of a permit on the basis it satisfied the requirements of Clause 52.15.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Policy > Statements of Planning Policy

 3. Major Promotions Signs – the urban design/visual amenity matrix

The principles for assessing a major promotion are generally well established, see GPAs > Signs > Need for an objective approach.

In Media Circus (VIC) Pty Ltd v Greater Dandenong CC [2025] VCAT 514, which involved an application to construct and erect a V-shaped, double sided electronic major promotional sky sign, the Tribunal identified the urban design/visual amenity principles that it considered relevant to the case. These included:

  • Signs have an important role in the built environment.
  • Planning policy seeks good urban design, whether it is built form or signage.
  • Policy seeks to avoid visual clutter.
  • The review site is located in an identified gateway location #15. This is a linear gateway and policy seeks to avoid advertising elements such as billboards, a-frames, inflatables, flags and banners, within the extent of the gateway zone (particularly along main roads) and advertising elements such as billboards and banners on buildings which provide an interface with Eastlink Freeway.
  • Major promotion signs are not prohibited but policy at clauses 22.11 strongly discourages major promotion signs along freeways. However, at clause 52.05-8 major promotion signs are encouraged in industrial locations in a manner that complements or enhances the character of the area. [25]

Having regard to the above, the Tribunal considered the key question in the matter before it is whether the proposed major promotion sign is acceptable having regard to the gateway location and to the Eastlink freeway?

The application was refused by Council. Connect East, the operator of East Link, objected to the application.

On urban design issues, the Tribunal was satisfied that the proposed sign ‘does not conflict with the design aesthetic achieved along the motorway corridor’ policy in Clause 22.12. It considered that there are no significant urban features along this section of the corridor and that the sign would not detract from the features described by Connect East, such as the ‘black railing and fencing’. It is also noted there is inadequate room in this section of the Eastlink corridor for landscaping, so it has no impact on any vegetated or landscaping setting.

On visual clutter issues, the Tribunal was not persuaded by Connect East that the proposed sign would result in visual clutter or disorder. It stated:

The sign is different from the existing signage in Bridge Road. I have described the sign as ‘neat’. That is, it is restrained in that it will sit above the industrial building with two faces orientated to the north and southbound traffic on Eastlink. I would not refuse the proposed sign because it would result in visual clutter. [52]

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Advertising signs > Major promotion signs > Need for an objective approach

 4. Jumping the gun: applying for a store ancillary to a dwelling before construction of the dwelling

In the General Residential Zone (GRZ) a Store is a section 2 use subject to the following condition:

Must be in a building, not a dwelling, and used to store equipment, goods, or motor vehicles used in conjunction with the occupation of a resident of a dwelling on the lot.

In Droffelaar v Mildura RCC [2025] VCAT 562, application was made for a store on land in the GRZ. Plans submitted with the application show both ‘proposed store’ and ‘proposed shed’. It also shows a separate ‘proposed dwelling’ toward the front of the land.

Council refused the application because it does not meet the requirements of the condition under section 2 of Clause 32.08-2 of the Mildura Planning Scheme.

The Applicant submitted that:

  • the use condition does not expressly require the existence of a dwelling before an application to use land for a store is lodged, it only requires the store must be in a building and the use must be in conjunction with the occupation of a resident of a dwelling on the lot;
  • the use condition does not refer to a resident of an ‘existing’ dwelling and the authors of the use condition must have intended to omit reference to an existing dwelling because another use condition in the GRZ, for a ‘small second dwelling’, refers to an ‘existing’ dwelling;
  • if the purpose of the use condition is to ensure that a dwelling must exist and be occupied before a store use starts, the purpose is met because the Applicant’s intention is to only use the store after the dwelling exists and is occupied (by an employee of the Applicant’s ‘electrical business’ based in Mildura) and evidenced by the inclusion of the dwelling plans in the application;
  • the grant of permission to use the land for a store can be consistent with and implement this purpose by including a permit condition that requires the dwelling to be constructed and occupied before the store use starts (‘permit condition’); and
  • a permit condition is a valid condition as a ‘satisfaction’ condition referred to in section 62(2)(a) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) and is a condition of the type described as a ‘discretionary’ condition in the Department of Transport and Planning’s guide ‘Writing Planning Permits’.

The Tribunal accepted the Applicant’s submission that the use condition does not prohibit the lodging of any application for permission to use a store. It does not, for example, impose a requirement on an application in the same way that a minimum garden area must be provided in an application for permission to develop specified forms of accommodation.

However, the Tribunal did not accept the Applicant’s submission that the reference to a dwelling in the use condition includes a proposed dwelling. It considered that in the context of the planning scheme as a whole, the reference in the condition to ‘dwelling’ must be to an existing dwelling. If the authors of the planning scheme had intended that it include a proposed dwelling, they did not express that intention.

The Tribunal noted other conditions maybe of more relevance, such as the use ‘car park’ in the GRZ is a section 2 use that is subject to the condition:

Must be used in conjunction with another use in Section 1 or 2

The Tribunal considered that if a car park is not capable of use in conjunction with the other specified use when a permit application is determined, the responsible authority should refuse to grant permission. It should not include the use condition as a permit condition as a way of complying with the use condition.

With respect to the inclusion of the proposed dwelling on the plans, the Tribunal considered this aspect is not determinative as to construction of the use condition and ‘muddies the waters’. It stated:

Having regard to the purpose of the use condition, it is desirable that there be certainty about the dwelling (ie that the dwelling is an existing dwelling) so that the resident and his/her/their occupation is known and the items he/she/they intend to store can be identified and considered. [56]

This was despite the Applicant’s submission that a previous permit had provided a condition that the use of the store could not commence until the dwelling ‘as shown on the endorsed plans is constructed’.

Finally, the Applicant submitted the permit condition is valid because:

  • a responsible authority may include any condition in a permit that ‘it thinks fit’;
  • it conforms to the specified authorised condition that specified things may be done to the responsible authority’s satisfaction; and
  • it is a ‘discretionary’ condition of the type referred to in the Department’s guide.

The Tribunal was not persuaded with the Applicant’s submissions. It stated:

The broad power to include a permit condition is confined by the decisions of the Courts on what are valid conditions. The permit condition is not a ‘satisfaction’ condition because it does not expressly require anything to be done to the responsible authority’s satisfaction. It would therefore not create any review opportunities for an owner. A ‘discretionary’ condition may not be a valid condition and the Department’s guide is not law. [59]

Whilst acknowledging the inconvenience to the Applicant, it found that the inconvenience cannot be avoided having regard to the meaning and effect of the use condition.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Conditions > Validity of conditions

 5. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction on a boatshed?

Boatsheds and bathing boxes enjoy a special place in the Victorian beachside community as privately accessed structures on public beaches.

In Godino v Mornington Peninsula SC [2025] VCAT 527, the Council refused an application for additions and alterations to an existing boatshed. Council’s grounds of refusal included:

  • The public land manager has refused to consent to the use/development, with the written consent being required under the Public Park and Recreation Zone, Clause 36.02-3.
  • A delegate of the Minister has refused to consent to the proposed use/development per section 70(1)(b) of the Marine and Coastal Act 2018.

Of concern to the Applicant was a condition that the removable timber steps are not to be permanently affixed to the boatshed and are to be stored within the boatshed whenever they are not in use, including overnight.

Council referred the application to the Dromana Foreshore Committee as the relevant Crown Land Committee of Management for the subject land under the Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978. However, at the Hearing the Council submitted on reflection the Dromana Foreshore Committee is not the relevant Crown Land Manager. It referred to Deakin University v Whitehorse CC (Red Dot) [2009] VCAT 134 which held that committees of management who are not a municipal council or Parks Victoria are not the public land manager.

The Tribunal agreed with this submission, noting that under Clause 73.01 of the Planning Scheme public land manager is defined as:

The Minister, government department, public authority or municipal council having responsibility for the care or management of public land. In relation to Crown land reserved under an Act and managed or controlled by a committee of management, other than Parks Victoria, the Great Ocean Road Coast and Parks Authority or a municipal council, it means the Minister administering that Act and does not include the committee of management.

Instead, Council submitted that it is the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (DEECA) that is delegate for the Minister responsible for administering the Marine and Coastal Act acts as public land manager. No consent was provided by DEECA to the application. As such, the Tribunal held it did not have jurisdiction to consider the case because the application cannot be granted in the absence of the Minister’s consent under the Marine and Coastal Act.

Further, the Tribunal held that section 61(3) of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (P&E Act) makes particular provision for applications for review of permit applications where approval is also required under the Marine and Coastal Act and that approval has been refused or deemed to be refused.

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Boatshed, Jurisdiction of the Tribunal

 6. Removal of significant quantity of native vegetation rejected

In Jennings v Cardinia SC [2025] VCAT 567, the Tribunal upheld a Council refusal to construct a dwelling and outbuilding and to remove native vegetation. The subject land is in the Rural Conservation Zone (RCZ), Environmental Significance Overlay (ESO) and Bushfire Management Overlay (BMO).

Both the Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (DEECA) and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) both provided conditional consent to the development and vegetation removal.

The Tribunal observed that the proceeding reflects the tension in developing land in an area of high bushfire risk, that has high environmental values, and yet sits within a cluster of already developed dwellings proximate to a small township.

In response to an environmental report accompanying the application, the Tribunal considered there should be no automatic assumption that vegetation loss is necessary to achieve a development outcome, in consideration of the relevant planning context. It stated:

The removal of vegetation as sought is not consistent with the purposes of the RCZ. I accept that suitable offsets under clause 52.17 could be achieved elsewhere to compensate for the overall loss of native vegetation removal arising from this development proposal. However, the major concern I have in respect to the vegetation removal is the local landscape impact of removing more than 550 trees from the site. I am required to assess the vegetation removal in the context of the totality of planning controls that apply to the site, and this includes the RCZ and ESO purposes and decision guidelines. [81]

With respect to the BMO requirements which results in the loss of vegetation in anticipation of development, the Tribunal noted the following requirement:

Ensure settlement growth and development approvals can implement bushfire protection measures without unacceptable biodiversity impacts by discouraging settlement growth and development in bushfire affected areas that are important areas of biodiversity. (Tribunal emphasis)

Overall, the Tribunal held:

Not all sites have equal development potential. This site needs to be heavily and significantly modified to make it bushfire safer. This modification is directly contrary to the zoning, overlay and policy outcomes sought in the scheme.

I accept the relevant vegetation assessments of the review site and agree that there has been some level of vegetation disturbance evident across that part of the review site in which the built form is proposed. I observed this from my site inspection. However, despite the legitimate attempts by the applicant to minimise the extent of vegetation removal required, the loss of vegetation to the extent proposed will have an unreasonable impact on the biodiversity of the site and the contribution this site makes to the broader landscape character of the Northern Hills area. [87-88]

See also:

  • Guide to Planning Appeals: Native vegetation > Balancing policy